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1 Introduction
An increased thirst for scientific knowledge and a desire to advance humanity’s presence in space prompts
the need for improved technology to send crewed vehicles to places such as the Moon, Mars, and nearby
passing asteroids [2]. Landing at any of these locations will require vehicle capabilities greater than that
previously used during the Apollo program or those applied in Low Earth Orbit. In particular, the vehicle and
the on-board crew must be capable of executing precision landing in sub-optimal landing conditions during
time-critical, high-stakes mission scenarios, such as Landing Point Designation (LPD) , or the critical phase
of determining the vehicle’s final touchdown point. Most proposed solutions involve automated control of
landing vehicles, accepting no input from the on-board crew - effectively relegating them to payload [11],
[30]. While this method is satisfactory for some missions, an automation-only approach during this critical
mission phase may be placing the system at a disadvantage by neglecting the human capability of [what?].
Therefore, the landing system may result in a lack of dynamic flexibility to unexpected landing terrain or
in-flight events.
It is likely that executing LPD will require an ideal distribution of authority between the on-board crew
and an automated landing system. However, this distribution is application-specific and not easily calculated.
Current science does not provide enough detailed or explicit theories regarding allocation of automation, and
the advantages provided by biological and digital pilots (either acting as the sole authoritarian or as a co-
ordinated team) are difficult to describe in quantitative measures. Despite previous experience in piloting
vehicles on the Moon, few cognitive models describing the decision-making process exist. The specializa-
tion of the pilot and the application pose significant practical challenges in regular observations in the target
environment.
The lack of quantitative knowledge results in predominantly qualitative design trade-offs during pre-
mission planning. While qualitative analyses have proven to be useful to the mission designer, an under-
standing founded on quantitative metrics regarding the relationship between human control and mission
design will provide the sufficient supplementary information necessary for overall success. In particular,
increased knowledge of the impact of human control on landing trajectory design would allow for more
efficient and thorough conceptual mission planning. This knowledge would allow visualization of the flight
envelope possible for various degrees of human control and help establish conceptual estimations of critical
mission parameters such as fuel consumption or task completion time. This report details an experiment
undertaken to further understanding of the impact of moderate degrees of human control on landing trajec-
tory design or vice versa during LPD. This report briefly summarizes current understanding and modeling of
moderate control during LPD and similar applications, reviews previous and current efforts in implementing
LPD, examines the pilot study to observe subjects in a simulated LPD task, and discusses the significance
of findings from the pilot study.
2 Background
The relationship between moderate degrees of human control and landing trajectory design during landing
point designation (LPD) can be broken into several elements: the definition of LPD; quantifying the alloca-
tion of responsibilities for completing LPD; and cognitive modeling efforts in LPD and related fields. This
section describes each of these elements in greater detail and relates to previous and current studies.
2.1 Landing Point Designation
Landing Point Designation (LPD), in its simplest form, is the opportunity to select a final landing site. This
decision-making process trades off selection criteria such as the fuel required to reach a site, safeness of the
site (e.g., the roughness, slope, and proximity of rocks and craters), or the proximity of the landing to a point
1
(a) Landing Point Designator (b) LEM Cockpit Interior
Figure 1: Landing Point Designation for Apollo [17].
of interest. The relative importance of each criterion is also determined by the operator and is based on a
priori or real-time data. This task can be completed in a variety of ways: an on-board pilot, an automatic
landing system, a remote operator, or a combination of these entities. There have been six instances of lunar
LPD (the Apollo landings) but this task has been compared to other applications such as engine out [6].
Lunar LPD generally occurs during the final approach of the landing trajectory, prior to terminal touchdown
and lasts no more than two minutes.
The Apollo astronauts performed LPD at a relatively high degree of control, relying predominantly on
their perception of the lunar terrain as seen through the Lunar Excursion Module (LEM) window. Both
the Commander (who piloted the LEM) and the Lunar Module Pilot (LMP) (who operated the other space
systems and informed the Commander of vehicle and mission status) [22] participated in LPD, with very
specific roles. The Commander worked primarily with the landing point designator (Figure 1). The landing
point designator is a reticle-etched window located on the left side of the LEM. The Commander would
align the reticles etched on the outer and inner windows and view the lunar terrain across 2◦ (vertical)
and 5◦ (horizontal) scales. The digital autopilot would indicate where to find the designated landing site,
which the LMP would then read to the Commander. If the Commander opted to land at an alternative
location, he would call in this decision by moving the control stick in the direction and number of “clicks”
as proportionate to the landing point designator. This process continued for several iterations, with the LMP
reading to until the LEM reached the predesignated time-to-go and performed terminal descent.
The crew interacted with the on-board flight computer through the Display and Keyboard unit (DSKY).
The crew used a series of guidance computer programs including the Landing Maneuver Approach Phase
or Program 64 (P64) and the Velocity Nulling Guidance or Program 65 (P65). The crew also had optional
programs, such as P66, Rate of Descent, or P67, Manual Guidance. P66 had several options: the flight
computer controls the vertical speed and nulls the horizontal speed; the flight computer controls only the
vertical speed and the crew controls the final attitude; the flight computer nulls the horizontal speed while
the crew controls the engine throttle (i.e., the descent rate); the crew controls the rate of descent and the
attitude and lands the LEM themselves [24]. P67 was only to be used if P66 failed and permitted complete
crew control of the engine throttle. All Apollo landings were flown using P66, with the crew dialing in this
program before the automatic switch to P65.
Unsurprisingly, this method of LPD places a strong reliance on the landing trajectory. The LEM must
fly at an angle that permits visibility of the landing site. This viewing angle is a function of the landing
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location and the sun angle. At certain angles, craters and rocks may cast shadows across the terrain that
distort the astronaut’s view, either by hiding obstacles or obfuscating landmarks that the astronauts used for
terrain orientation. The effects of lighting were particularly pronounced in Apollo 12. The astronauts relied
on the “Snowman” crater configuration, but temporarily could not find this landmark, adding a slight delay
to the mission sequence. In general, the LEM flew at a flight path angle of n◦ with a viewing angle of n◦.
LPD began after Powered Descent Initiation and shortly after entering “high gate” (P64) [32]. At high gate,
the LEM was at a range of 26000 ft [24], an altitude of 7515 ft, had a descent rate of -145 fps, and an
inertial velocity of 506 fps [3]. At the end of LPD, the vehicle entered “low gate” (P65/P66) at a range and
altitude of 2000 ft [24] and 500 ft, respectively, with a descent rate of -16 fps, and an inertial velocity of 55
fps [3].
During the Apollo era, standard perceptions of piloting changed substantially. The Apollo astronauts
were converts of the test pilot program, accustomed to piloting new aircraft through standard procedures
and the occasional death-defying maneuver. A pilot’s worth was defined predominantly by his skill at
mastering the machine, with little guidance from any automation system. However, the risks and unknowns
surrounding the first manned landing attempt on another surface prompted the development of a robust
digital autopilot or flight computer, leading several pilots to feel as though they were “spam in a can” [21].
The astronauts’ feelings were best summarized by John Glenn: “We don’t want to just sit there and be
just like a passenger aboard this thing. We will be working the controls [1].” This feeling exists today,
and has survived through the modern era of spaceflight. However, as the situations have grown increasing
complex, this perception has adapted. Modern approaches to landing on the Moon has increased the role of
the automation system. This change is most apparent in the Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance
Technology (ALHAT) project.
The ALHAT project is sponsored by NASA and involves developing a technology suite to provide safe
and precise lunar landing for both crewed and robotic vehicles [4]. This technology aims to provide global
access to the lunar surface under any lighting condition. An extensive study has been undertaken to design
the appropriate displays to support astronauts during LPD. In this investigation, LPD is conducted similarly
to the Apollo mission: the task occurs after Powered Descent Initiation, during the final approach to the
lunar surface. The vehicle is at an altitude of 1000m with a velocity of 100 m/s at the start of LPD, and
terminal descent occurs at about 30m from the surface [11]. However, there are variations on this trajectory,
depending on the mission.
There are several notable differences in the LPD methodology. First, ALHAT employs a LIght Detection
And Radar (LIDAR) sensor to capture real-time data regarding the terrain. Second, an Autonomous Flight
Manager (AFM) processes this data and selects alternative sites to present to the operator. Third, the crew
does not have the option of manually piloting the vehicle to the lunar surface. Although windows are
expected to be on the final vehicle design, the majority of the vehicle interaction is through the AFM and the
flight displays. There are three displays available to the on-board crew, but only the primary flight display
(PFD) and the LPD display (Figure 2) provide information to the crew to complete LPD. The PFD provides
vehicle status information - fuel remaining, attitude, rate of descent, altitude, etc - but also provides a camera
viewpoint of the lunar terrain in the foreground. The LPD display presents a shaded top-down picture of
the landing area, with the results of the LIDAR scan superimposed. Areas that are hazardous (craters,
rocks, slopes, or roughness values exceeding tolerances) are shaded red, and three ranked alternative sites
are provided. The crew selects a new landing site by pressing the associated button, and the AFM sends the
appropriate guidance commands to the vehicle.
At this time, the AFM automatically pilots the vehicle to the ground. However, if the crew does not
make a decision within the allotted time, the AFM will default to the first ranked site.
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(a) Primary Flight Display. (b) LPD Display.
Figure 2: Reference Displays Used for ALHAT.
A full list of symbology can be found in the Human-System Interface Cockpit Display Documentation [5].
2.2 Allocation of Responsibilities
The LPD task can be completed by any of the following operators: an on-board crew, an automatic landing
system, or a remote operator. In each case, the identified operator is in charge of all aspects of LPD with
no interference from the other operators. Additionally, the type of LPD can then be easily described - fully
manual, robotic, tele-operated, respectively. However, when two or more operators are working in tandem,
describing the type of LPD performed is more difficult. In particular, determining the absolute amount of
automation allocation is a challenge as only relative descriptors (i.e., more automated, more manual) can
be used. While knowing an absolute value may not be critical to mission operations, this lack of a ranking
system reduces the ability to draw inferences regarding an increased application of automation. For example,
a common concern is the correlation between automation and human workload. Simplistically, the amount
of automation could be measured in terms of a percentage of the task that is assigned to the automation.
General intuition leads to the belief that a greater percentage of automation requires less workload from the
human operator. However, current literature [31] [28] notes that the category of task that is automated must
be taken into consideration. Human operators perform better if information collection and presentation is
automated; issues such as complacency and loss of situation awareness become a problem if the automation
plays a large role in the decision-making process.
LPD is composed of several fundamental subtasks: collecting information, interpreting the information,
creating solution options, selecting a solution, executing the chosen solution. The information necessary for
LPD consists primarily of the vehicle status, mission status, and characteristics of the landing area terrain.
Once this information is collected, it must be interpreted, creating a cost map of desirable and undesirable
terrain based on mission constraints and operator preferences. From this cost map, landing site options are
created in response to the problem of where to land. A final landing site is selected and executed by piloting
the vehicle to the final destination. Each type of LPD, Apollo, and ALHAT can be compared to this schema
to examine where the automation or crew is assigned. Tele-operated LPD is omitted in Table 1 as it is
unlikely due to delays in communication.
The chart illustrates the complexity of trying to rank the amount of automation. Is each task assumed
to be of equal importance or difficulty? Are all combinations of n automated tasks, 5 − n human tasks
equatable? Several studies [26] [27] [19] [25] have created taxonomies of levels of automation for general
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Operator Collecting Interpreting Creating Selecting Executing
On-board crew Human Human Human Human Human
Apollo Human/Auto Human Human Human Human/Auto
ALHAT Human/Auto Auto Auto Human/Auto Auto
Automatic Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto
Table 1: LPD task breakdown.
cases. Endsley and Kaber’s ten-point levels of automation scale provides sufficient principles appropriate
to define automation and compare differences. This scale and its application to the four options (on-board
crew, Apollo, ALHAT, and Automatic) is listed in Table 2.
Level Monitor Generate Select Implement LPD Option
1: Manual Control H H H H On-board crew
2: Action Support H/C H H H/C Apollo
3: Batch Processing H/C H H C
4: Shared Control H/C H/C H H/C
5: Decision Support H/C H/C H C
6: Blended Decision Making H/C H/C H/C C ALHAT
7: Rigid System H/C C H C ALHAT
8: Automated Decision Making H/C H/C C C
9: Supervisory Control H/C C C C
10: Full Automation C C C C Automatic
Table 2: Endsley and Kaber’s Ten-Point Levels of Automation.
The allocation of responsibilities is indicated by Human (H) or Computer (C).
Under this taxonomy, monitoring is regarded as scanning displays/terrain to perceive system status; gen-
erating consists of formulating landing site options; selecting is choosing a final landing site; implementing
is piloting the vehicle to the targeted destination. As seen in Table 2, the ALHAT version of LPD does not
align perfectly with only one level of automation. The AFM does not permit the on-board crew to generate
any site selections, unlike Level 6, but the crew is not the sole authority on site selection, which is the defi-
nition of Level 7. As seen in both tables, defining an absolute amount of automation for LPD is impossible,
but the allocation of responsibilities can still be regarded as a rank variable in either levels of automation
or levels of human control based on the resemblance of one option to an extreme. However, as the changes
of allocation become less pronounced, the more difficult it is to rank the options. Nevertheless, a level
of automation comparable to Apollo is universally considered as a “high” level of human control whereas
an automation allocation such as ALHAT could be considered as a “moderate” level (with respect to both
extremities).
2.3 Cognitive Modeling
Much of the current understanding of the relationship between human control and landing trajectory design
during LPD is limited to six data points - the performance of the only six lunar landing attempts, all from the
Apollo era. Although this number is low by statistical and modeling standards, much can be gleaned from
the LPD task description, training material, astronaut debriefings, related scenarios, and simulated studies.
There are several studies of relevance to this investigation. Bennett [3] conducted an investigation following
Apollo 11 comparing the pre-mission planning and actual landing trajectory of Apollo 11. This study also
included commentary on Apollo 12. In these analyses, Bennett noted that pilot control resulted in variations
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in the flight profile; this was explained by Neil Armstrong as “I [was] just absolutely adamant about my
God-given right to be wishy-washy about where I was going to land.” Other historical studies involve the
Space Shuttle Orbiter. Holland and VanderArk [16] performed a task analysis regarding Shuttle re-entry.
In this study, they examined the roles of the three crew members involved with re-entry. Their detailed
investigation included vehicle status at each subtask and a list of interactions with the Orbiter interface.
However, this analysis lists the tasks in a sequential order and does not account for off-nominal situations.
The ALHAT team has conducted studies regarding the crew during LPD, including prompts for super-
visory commands [15], suggestions for cockpit display designs [14], in particular, for the primary flight
displays and horizontal situation indicator.
Several key studies have focused on various elements of LPR. Forest et al. developed a landing site
selection algorithm that, when given terrain data, would highlight key hazards and suggest alternative sites
based on the cost function preference of the crew. This study provided an initial reference LPR display, but
did not model human interaction with such a system [13]. Needham investigated the impact of varying levels
of automation on human performance during LPD, concluding that higher automation allowed for quicker
time to complete [23]. In addition, Needham developed a set of icons that would overlay landing site terrain
characteristics on a top-down synthetic map. An experiment was also performed to observe the impact of
varying levels of automation. However, the subjects used in this experiment were graduate students with
little piloting experience and not closely representative of astronauts. Sostaric and Rea modeled the impact
of LPR on trajectory design [29]. This impact exists primarily in the need for a window viewing angle and
required vehicle divert capability. This study provides initial estimations on the change in metrics (e.g.,
time to touchdown, trajectory profile) but only for a high-level concept of LPD; no further commentary
on specific human tasks is provided. Lastly, Chua et al. have derived a task model and used this model
to examine bottlenecks of LPD [8]. These bottlenecks were addressed by redesigning the LPD display to
simplify the information layout and to utilize new symbolism to represent site characteristics. This LPD task
model also incorporates expert decision-making theory [18] to account for specialized astronaut behavior
[9]. However, this study is based on theory and lacks observations from equatable subjects.
Other studies, such as Chua and Feigh [7] utilized experimental data to quantify human performance
during LPR under varying definitions of performance success. The results of this study illustrate that pilots’
decision-making times result in heavy penalties with regard to fuel consumption. However, pilots generally
select sites that are regarded as safe or near the points of interest. The analysis results were also compared
to a reference automation system to determine areas of better performance. The automated landing system
generally performed better than pilots in missions where fuel was the most critical factor. However, the
speed of the automation did not necessarily translate to better sites, as pilots routinely selected safer sites
closer to points of interest.
3 Experimental Methods
3.1 Objective
As part of a larger body of research on characterizing the LPD performance envelope, especially with
changes to landing trajectory and lunar lighting effects, this paper presents the results of an experiment
designed to measure the impact of lunar lighting on pilot performance during LPD, especially during mod-
erate levels of human control. In addition to this main research question, the results of this experiment
may provide answers as to what information the pilots use to inform the decision-making process and what
strategies are employed to select the best landing site. Crew performance and decision-making are likely
influenced by several factors. Previous lunar landings and consultation with subject matter experts have
identified lunar lighting as the most paramount influence on crew performance. This experiment establishes
lighting as an independent variable with two treatments: ideal which represents conditions in which craters
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are easily outlined and not distorted by shadow or conversely, lit too brightly there is low contrast discernible
to the human eye; and poor which provides minimal lighting (enough to significantly affect pilot perception)
but excludes flying in completely dark conditions (i.e., the entire landing area must be mostly visible, not a
black square). Quantitatively, maps with approximately 25% shadowed area were deemed “poor”; greater
percentages of map shadows were excluded from consideration in this experiment.
Three main hypotheses have been formulated: as the lighting decreases in quality (ideal to poor), the
LPD task grows more difficult and thus 1) increases the task time to complete; 2) decreases the landing site
score; and 3) decreases the pilot performance score. Two additional sub-hypotheses were formulated regard-
ing the pilot’s perception of the task: 1) as pilot trust in automation increases, the landing site score and pilot
performance score improve; and 2) as pilot perception of lighting is factored more into the decision-making
process, the landing site and pilot performance scores decreases due to the inclusion of this additional infor-
mation.
Five dependent measures were selected to test the formulated hypotheses and a sixth variable was mea-
sured to provide additional information regarding the LPD scenario context. (1) Time to complete (Tc) is
the time in seconds from the beginning of the LPR task, when the pitch-up maneuver is completed, to when
the vehicle touches the lunar terrain. Based on the experiment procedure, Tc is measured from when the
participant initiates the scenario to the moment the participant hits “ARM”, or calls in his final site selection.
(2) Landing site score (LSS) is the quality of the landing site based primarily on the roughness and slope.
(3) Participant Performance Score (PPS) is defined as the participant’s ability to perform the LPD task and
accounts for the LSS and the time to complete. These three dependent variables were measured after every
run. (4) Automation Trust is based on a 5-point Likert scale regarding the participant’s overall trust of the
automation, which consists of the suggested site rankings. A low rating (1) specified full trust in the automa-
tion system, never referring to the participant’s own judgment but relying solely on the automation ranking.
Conversely, a high rating (5) denoted no trust in the automation system, never using the automation site
ranking. (5) Lighting Impact Opinion is also based on a 5-point Likert scale and represents the participant’s
opinion on the impact of lighting on his decision-making. A low rating (1) meant no impact, whereas a high
rating (5) signified full impact, to the point where the participant changed his strategy based on the lighting
quality. Automation trust and lighting impact opinion were measured at the end of each participant’s exper-
iment. Lastly, the sixth variable was not directly measured but asked during the participant’s debriefing and
involves the (6) participant’s strategy or decision-making procedure. The participants drew or enumerated
a series of steps to complete the LPD task, including details such as method of site evaluation (direction, in
order of suggested rank, etc) and interaction with the display.
3.2 Experimental Design
The major hypotheses of this experiment concern the impact of lunar lighting effects on pilot performance.
Lunar lighting is treated as a within-subjects independent variable of two levels: poor and ideal, based
on consultation with subject matter experts. The experiment also uses the nominal LPD initial trajectory
conditions proposed by the ALHAT (vehicle is moving at 1km/s and is at 1km altitude). This trajectory
provides an experiment baseline while representing a possible operation state for a moderate level of human
control.
3.3 Participants
A minimum of 19 participants are needed for this study to achieve a power of 0.8 with an α value of 0.1.
This number of participants is derived from the power calculations for a one-sample, one-tailed, paired t-
test 1 and assumes standard deviation (σTc , σmf , σPPS , σLSS) values of 1 and absolute mean (µ) difference
1Using Russ Lenth’s java applet tool [20].
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scores of 0.5. An α value of 0.1 was selected to reduce the possibility of a Type II error. For this experiment,
the null hypothesis (H0) states that the current system is sufficient to support the pilot during both lighting
conditions. The alternative hypothesis (HA) states that a new system must be adopted that accounts for two
different lighting conditions. A Type II error is committed if the experiment results reject HA, therefore
keeping the old system, when lighting does, in fact, pose a significant impact on the dependent measures.
Conversely, a Type I error is committed if the experiment results reject H0 and adopt a new system when
lighting did not have a significant impact on the dependent measures. Committing a Type I error would
result in additional costs to the designer but would provide the pilot with all the tools he needs to complete
LPD. Simplistically, the safety risk is low, since the tool exists on-board with the operator. However, a Type
II error poses a greater safety risk to the pilot, as the necessary tools may not be present with the old system.
Six participants were tested during the pilot study of this experiment. Each participant was an engi-
neering graduate student between 23-27 years of age. No participants had any flight experience, but all
participants were familiar with vehicle dynamics and manned spaceflight. Each testing session was one
hour long and consisted of initial briefing, training, and debriefing sections. The initial briefing introduced
the LPD task, the simulator, and performance considerations that were explicitly included in the PPS (fuel
and safety). To avoid bias, the participants were not told of the weighting on these parameters. The partic-
ipants trained on ten scenarios similar to the actual runs. In each scenario, the participant was told he had
60s to complete the LPD task, otherwise the mission would abort. Every run began with an initial map of
the landing area, with a resolution slightly less than the actual map. This initial map did not contain any
highlighted hazards but did include lighting effects as seen from a top-down view. Participants were told
they could study this initial map as much as they wanted and to start the scenario when they felt ready. The
practice runs differed from the actual runs by including the sites’ fuel and safety scores. Additionally, each
site was magnified to illustrate the “actual” hazards within each landing footprint. The participants were
told they could trust the hazard information, but similar to the actual performance of a sensor, there were
occasional inaccuracies. All of the training materials are listed in Appendix.
After ten practice scenarios (total time approximately 15-30min depending on time spent on practice
feedback), the participants were asked to complete two additional, actual runs. They were not given feedback
on their performance. The experiment concluded with a debriefing, asking the participants to walk through
the decision-making process of their two actual runs, to evaluate their Automation Trust and Opinion on the
Lighting Impact, and to enumerate or sketch their procedure to complete LPD. The Appendix includes a full
list of the debriefing questions.
3.4 Apparatus
3.4.1 Hardware
Since this pilot study was intended to collect initial information on the LPD task, a simple simulation was
set up, with more focus on the LPD display. The LPD display is equipped with one main, top-down view
of the expected landing terrain (including the lighting effects). This main window, as seen in the Appendix,
contains highlighted hazard information overlayed on the terrain map. A set of yellow reference bars are
included to denote the pixel length of 50m. Three sites are provided to the operator, listed in rank of
automation preference. Site 1 is outlined in blue and corresponds to the blue button to the right of the main
window; Site 2 and Site 3 are yellow and purple, respectively.
To make a site selection, the participant was asked to click on the corresponding site button with the
mouse (wherein the gray circle turns yellow) and immediately click on the ARM button (the now yellow
circle turns green). The simulation ends as soon as the participant clicks on the ARM button. In the case of
an emergency, the participant could click on the red STOP button. No runs were aborted or canceled by the
user.
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This display was designed in Microsoft Powerpoint, with the button presses hyperlinked to other slides.
These slides showed the pressed button “depressed” as to give visual indicator of what button was pressed.
Additionally, audio was provided to the participant (e.g., “Site 1 selected”, “Initiating landing sequence”).
XNote Stopwatch [12] was used to provide the 60s countdown clock and the timer. This external program
was initiated by using the hotkeys G and O, respectively, which the participants were asked to type in to
start the scenario. The timer was assigned to record the time whenever the right mouse button was clicked.
This setup was placed on a standard PC using Windows 7 OS, but could have easily been placed on earlier
operating systems, such as Windows XP.
3.4.2 Software
There were two major pieces of software used for this experiment: a map generation suite (Digital Elevation
Map Maker (DEMMaker) and The Applied Physics Laboratory Navigator (APLNav) developed by Johns
Hopkins University APL and a faux automated landing system. DEMMaker was used to create the lunar
maps and the associated shading and the faux automation was used to find three landing sites and score the
sites.
The DEMMaker software takes several inputs: the latitude and longitude of a central location anywhere
on the Moon; a resolution (m/px); an x− and y− distance (km) or conversely, width and height (px). With
this information, DEMMaker creates a DEM. The software refers to an internal database of major craters
from the Goldstone Lunar Data and the Clementine mission and then uses mathematical models to random
populate a distribution of smaller rocks and craters. The resultant DEM can be opened in APLNav for 3-D
viewing (with correct latitude and longitude placement on a Moon grid) with lighting and slope analyses
applied to the map. The user supplies a date-time string (e.g., 2011-288T12-00-00.000) and the map will
be shaded according to the celestial geometry and elevation of the mapped terrain. Similarly, the program
calculates the changes in slope and colorizes the map based on the slope degree. This map making suite
was used to generate 12 landing scenarios: an ideal and poor lighting of six landing maps around the South
Pole. Each map was 180 × 180 m. Areas containing about 25% of hazardous slopes were used. Maps with
approximately 25% completely shaded (i.e., completely black) were used.
The lighting conditions presented in this experiment do not represent the true ideal and poor conditions
at the South Pole. The ideal lighting, with maximum contrast, was created by feeding the APLNav software
the coordinates of the Apollo 15 landing site, a location near the equator. This lighting condition does
not occur naturally on the Moon. Additionally, poor lighting conditions on the Moon are actually under
complete darkness. The geometry of the South Pole does not allow considerable light reflection, whereas
the equatorial region permits so much that washout (where the terrain has low contrast due to too much
light) is a real lighting instantiation. The realistic “poor South Pole” condition is not an appropriate scenario
for this experiment as the participant would have no other option but to rely strict on sensor data. The date
for ideal lighting was the 284th day in 2011; poor lighting occurred on the 306th. An example of this is seen
in Figure 3.
Once the maps were created, shaded, and analyzed, they were fed into the faux automated landing
system. This faux algorithm was designed similar to the algorithm described by Cohanim and Collins [10],
with several major differences. First, the faux algorithm used in this experiment notably did not take into
account any information outside of the landing footprint itself. The reference footprint used was a 10m
diameter lunar lander. Therefore, only the slope within the footprint was used in consideration for landing
site selection. Second, two selection rules were used to narrow down all of the sites to three. A cost map
was generated that held fuel consumption (assumed to be a perfect circle where the center point on the
map invoked no fuel penalty) and slope at equal weighting. On the first pass, sites needed to match two
criteria: (1) cannot reside within a 10m border of the map edge; and (2) percentage of hazardous pixels
within the landing footprint must be less than a user-determined percentage of the pixel square area. This
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Figure 3: Difference between Poor and Ideal Lighting.
user-determined percentage was one of two fudge factors that could be adjusted, depending on whether
three sites were found. On the second pass, the resulting sites from the first pass were examined based on
rank (best to worst) and evaluated based on slope quality and overlap to other sites. The first three sites
that contained less than a user-determined percentage of ‘poor slope’ and ’overlap’ became the three sites
presented to the user. This second fudge factor could also be adjusted to account for more sites. This fudge
factor was more sensitive than the first fudge factor. The two setting of the two factors became de facto
indicators of scenario difficulty. Overall, an evaluation of twenty-plus maps resulted in six maps with the
same fudge factors, roughly equal hazardous slope percentages and roughly equal dark shading. The landing
locations are listed in Table 3
Table 3: Landing Locations.
Map # Latitude Longitude Map # Latitude Longitude
1 -89.64 246.130 4 -89.64 251.303
2 -89.72 251.260 5 -89.72 251.270
3 -89.64 251.297 6 -89.72 296.276
An additional piece of code was used to score the sites. This scoring algorithm is similar to the faux
automation but includes more information, similar to a theoretical, omniscient global performance evaluator.
The fuel was no longer considered as a perfect circle radiating from the center map point, but instead, a series
of elliptical contours (semi-major axis along the vertical) plotted at an eccentricity of 0.5. Sites reverse
downrange (lower half of the landing map) received a penalty in addition to their distance score. The safety
score now included roughness, calculated the number of pixels with a difference of 30cm from the average
elevation with in the landing footprint. The safety (i.e., LSS) and fuel scores ranged from 0 (perfect) to 1




This additional information did provide a different site ranking than that proposed by the faux algorithm.
A list of the actual rankings are provided in Table 4.
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Table 4: Comparison of Automated Rankings and Actual Rankings.
Map # Auto-Site 1 Auto-Site 2 Auto-Site 3
1 Site 1 Site 2 Site 3
2 Site 1 Site 3 Site 2
3 Site 2 Site 3 Site 1
4 Site 3 Site 1 Site 2
5 Site 1 Site 3 Site 2
6 Site 2 Site 1 Site 3
4 Analysis of Results
This section discusses the results of the pilot study, including the overall characteristics of the participants’
performance and the results of the statistical data analysis. All tests were run at a significance of α = 0.1.
4.1 Overall Results
Six participants were tested in this experiment, with no participant needing to abort or cancel a run. Overall,
the participants completed the LPD task in 13.656s (σTc = 6.545), obtained an average LSS of 0.147
(σLSS = 0.131), and achieved an average PPS of 0.115 (σPPS = 0.006). The range of TC is between
4.69 - 19.13s, with most participants completing the task in 9-15s (Figure 4). Boxplots of Tc, PPS, and LSS
across the two lighting conditions are presented in Figure 5.
Figure 4: Total Range of Participant Performance Scores, Landing Site Scores, and Time to Complete.
The Tc and LSS were compared to determine if a significant correlation existed. No significant correla-
tion exists, meaning that completing the task faster or slower did not help the participants pick better sites.
Interestingly, Tc and PPS do not have a significant correlation. This result implies that Tc is not a dominating
contributor to the PPS score, and the selection of a safe site is a larger driver.
The participants were also questioned regarding their opinion of the lighting impact and their trust in the
automated landing system. Figure 6 illustrates a histogram of responses.
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Figure 5: Range of Participant Performance Scores, Landing Site Scores, and Time to Complete across two
lighting treatments.
As seen in Figure 7, participants generally agreed with the automation and selected Site 1. However,
in the instance of Ideal lighting, this site was not the best, but the Site 3 presented to the participants was
actually the best. Site 1 and Site 3 were very similar based on their respective LSS - the difference between
the two sites was unlikely to have been detected by the participants. In the poor lighting scenario, a notable
distinction between the presented Site 1 and Site 2 existed, with the presented Site 2 having about five times
worst of an LSS compared to Site 1. Two participants did not recognize this difference.
4.2 Time to Complete
As discussed in Section 1, Tc is a critical measure due to its impact on fuel consumption. Tc was hy-
pothesized to increase as the quality of the lighting decreased. The participants were assumed to require
additional time to evaluate the areas of low visibility. The effects of lighting on Tc were tested using a
Wilcoxon-Matched Pairs test. Lighting was not determined to have a significant effect on Tc.
4.3 Landing Site Selection
The LSS denotes the quality of the landing site and is ranked on an absolute scale. This absolute scale means
that the quality of sites between landing areas can be compared on a one-to-one basis. The LSS was believed
to improve with ideal lighting, as participants would be able to better evaluate the safety of the landing sites.
The lighting effect was determined to be significant on the LSS using a Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs test with
Z = − 1.370(p = 0.0855). This result implies that the LSS in ideal lighting scenarios were better than
the LSS in poor lighting scenarios. The boxplot of LSS with respect to lighting quality can be seen in Fig. 5.
The means and standard deviations for the ideal and poor cases are µLSS−ideal = 0.184(σLSS−ideal = ±
0.166) and µLSS−poor = 0.111(σLSS−poor = ± 0.104), respectively. Lower values of LSS are better
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Figure 6: Histogram of Participants’ Opinion on the Lighting Impact and Trust in the Automation.
than higher values, with 0 being a perfect score and 1 being the worst score possible.
4.4 Participant Performance Score
The PPS is a measure of the participant’s performance. This dependent variable is calculated based on
the LSS and Tc, on an absolute scale. Participant performances can be compared directly to each other
without any transformation. The PPS was postulated to improve with ideal lighting, as the two factors
contributing to PPS would similarly become worse with lighting. The lighting effect was determined to
be significant on the PPS using a Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs test with Z = − 1.367(p = 0.086). The
results of this test imply that the PPS in ideal lighting scenarios were better than the PPS in poor lighting
scenarios. The boxplot of PPS with respect to lighting quality can be seen in Fig. 5. The means and
standard deviations for the ideal and poor cases are µPPS−ideal = 0.090(σPPS−ideal = ± 0.055 and
µPPS−poor = 0.139(σPPS−poor = ± 0.097), respectively. Lower values of PPS are better than higher
values, with 0 being a perfect score and 1 being the worst score possible.
4.5 Automation Trust
The automation trust metric was asked of the participants to determine whether the trust had a significant
contribution to the other metrics (Tc, LSS, PPS). The participants were hypothesized to have worse scores
in all metrics as the participant demonstrated less trust. A significant correlation does not exist between
automation trust and Tc, LSS, or PPS.
4.6 Opinion on Lighting Impact
The participants were asked to rate their opinion of the lighting impact on their overall performance (in
Tc, LSS, PPS). This measure was collected primarily to determine whether there was a notable difference
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Figure 7: Histogram of Participants’ Selection Compared to Actual Rank and Landing Site Score.
between perception and reality. The participants were expected to have worse scores as the participants noted
less impact from lighting. Participants who neglected lighting were believed to not account for possible
hidden craters or rocks within the landing area. The lighting impact opinion was deemed to have a significant
effect on Tc, with a Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficient ρ = 0.627, p = 0.008. This correlation
coefficient implies that as participants believe the lighting has a greater impact, the longer it takes them to
complete the LPD task. As seen in Figure 5, the participants took more time to evaluate sites in the ideal
lighting scenario, the inverse of the original hypothesis. There is no significant correlation between lighting
opinion and LSS or PPS.
5 Discussion
Overall, the results of this experiment demonstrated that lunar lighting plays a significant effect on the LSS
and the PPS, but not on the Tc. Participants do not perform the LPD task better, nor do they select better
landing sites in more or less time. They are able to complete the task between 9-15s, which is consistent
with previous literature. Participants generally chose better sites of the options presented to them. This
site selection quality and brevity in selecting the sites meant the global PPS was within the better half
of possible scores. The automation was an influence on participants’ decision making, but was not the
dominating influence. There is no significant correlation between the automation trust and Tc, LSS, and
PPS. Participants had varying opinions on the effect of lighting, with one-third of the participants declaring
the lighting to have a moderate impact. No significant correlation exists between lighting opinion and LSS
or PPS, but a significant correlation exists between lighting opinion and Tc. These results have interesting
implications. First, the participants did not believe that lighting had an effect on their performance, but
lighting still had a significant impact on the quality of the sites chosen and the overall performance. Second,
the participants who did take into account lighting took more time to analyze the maps, but this additional
processing time did not actually have a significant impact on the time to complete. The implications of all
of these results state that it may be of use to future designers to create two separate displays to account for
the difference in lighting effects, as the current display may not be sufficient for both types of environments.
However, further investigation is needed to specifically determine whether different displays are needed and
where those changes should occur.
The participants were polled on their strategy during the debriefing. They were asked to recall their
decision-making process during the two actual runs, to enumerate the qualities that factored into their de-
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cision making, and to present their task procedure to complete LPD, including their prescribed interactions
with the display mechanism. Safety was a greater criterion than fuel for all six participants, with most partic-
ipants defining perceived elevation difference (as noted by the shading) and size and density of highlighted
hazards within the landing footprint. Fuel was used as a tiebreaker for sites with similar safety characteris-
tics. This behavior and breakdown of considerations was expected and is consistent with previous studies.
However, the proximity and location of major highlighted hazards was handled differently by the partic-
ipants. Four participants generally chose sites that were far away from major highlighted hazards, citing
concerns with landing short or long of the intended site. All four participants cited possible uncertainties
with landing accuracy. However, two participants attempted to land near major highlighted hazards, opting
for sites near clusterings of craters. Of the two, one participant actively sought to land near more populated
groups of craters rather than large craters themselves. When pressed for justification for this behavior, the
two participants independently stated the crater clusterings had more potential for scientific exploration and
thus, these sites were preferable.
Many of the participants’ strategies overlapped to form one global strategy. Figure 8 illustrates this
global strategy and deviances from this central path. Half of the participants used the initial map to create
mental models of the expected landing sites. These participants started from the center of the map and noted
visible areas that did not have visible obstacles and not near craters. Some participants mentally ranked
these areas and others actively set expectations for sites to show up in those areas. All participants, when
starting the scenario, studied the highlighted hazardous areas. Those who used the initial map immediately
eliminated sites not within their desired areas and set preference to those sites nearing or matching pre-
scenario expectations. Further analysis showed that participants who studied the initial map on average
performed the task in 13.363s (σ = 2.983s) compared to an average Tc of 13.948s (σ8.333). However, a
Wilcoxon-Matched Pairs test proves that this Tc difference is not significant. There is also no significant
difference in LSS or PPS. All participants examined the landing sites for hazards within and outside of the
circle, although the specific methodology ranged from looking center to outward; or in the order of the site
rank; looking as far as 6 radius lengths beyond the site in a vertical than horizontal sweep, or looking simply
for high densities of hazards. The fuel criteria was used as a deciding factor, with two participants further
evaluating the science potential of the site. One participant recommended “double-checking” the selection
after selecting site, and then hitting ARM; the other participants immediately hit ARM after selecting a site.
No participants changed their minds after the initial site selection.
6 Conclusion
An experiment has been designed to determine the impact of lunar lighting on pilot performance during
landing point designation, especially during moderate levels of human control. A pilot study consisting of
six participants was conducted and the results analyzed to pose an initial approximation on actual study
results. Overall, the participants completed the landing point designation task as fast as 4.69s and as long as
19.76s, with most participants completing the task between 9-15s. In the majority of all runs, the participants
selected the top few sites presented to them. The lighting was varied at two levels: ideal and poor, and five
main dependent measures were collected: time to complete, landing site score, participant performance
score, opinion on lighting effect, and trust in automation. The participants selected higher-quality sites and
performed the task better in the ideal lighting scenario than the poor lighting scenario. While participants did
use more time during ideal lighting scenarios than poor lighting scenarios (contrary to the initial hypothesis),
this change in task time is not significant. All of the participants followed one general strategy in completing
the landing point designation task, with slight variations in search methodology and decision criteria. Half
of the participants formed mental models to help them prepare for the actual hazard highlighting results,



























performance score. Designing separate displays to account for the lighting differences may be of use to the
participants, but additional research is necessary before a final conclusion can be drawn.
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Appendix: Debriefing Questions and Training Materials
1. Can you talk to me about your thought process for your first run?
2. Can you talk to me about your thought process for your second run?
3. In summary, what decision attributes were you considering when selecting sites?
4. If you were training another person to complete this task, what universal strategy would you suggest
to them? Can you draw me a flow chart or make me a bulleted list?
5. How must did you trust the automated landing system?
1 - I trusted the landing system and always chose the suggested #1 site. I did not ever defer to my
own judgment.
2 -
3 - I thought the landing system was accurate but occasionally questioned the rankings. I deferred to
my judgment about half the time.
4 -
5 - I thought the landing system was not accurate at all and did not rely on the rankings. I relied solely
on my judgment.
6. How much did lighting affect your performance?




5 - Less trust
19
20
21
22
23
24
